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Publication Date

5-7-2026

Document Type

Casenote

Abstract

For decades, Georgia courts have treated Georgia Rule of Evidence 404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”) as an “evidentiary rule of inclusion,” an approach centered on the idea that if a prior act appeared relevant, it belonged in front of the jury. This practice was grounded in the belief that relevant prior criminal acts, like other forms of evidence, “should not lightly be excluded when central to the prosecution’s case.” In Wilson v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia narrowed the standard for the admissibility of other-acts evidence, signaling a continuing judicial shift toward stricter evidentiary control that aligns more closely with the federal standard.

The court rejected the State’s argument that Wilson’s desire “to rob people and to get their things” established a valid motive and emphasized that such reasoning amounted to the exact kind of general propensity argument that Rule 404(b) was intended to prevent. Similarly, the court clarified that evidence of a common plan or scheme must clearly demonstrate a distinctive modus operandi, thus raising the bar for admissibility under Rule 404(b). Wilson marks a pivotal doctrinal change, representing the culmination of a decade-long transition away from Georgia’s broadly inclusive approach to other-acts evidence and challenging longstanding assumptions about the flexibility of Rule 404(b). By demanding clear, non-character justifications for admitting other-acts evidence, the court emphasized that Rule 404(b) must be applied narrowly to prevent its use as a vehicle for general propensity arguments. The court’s holding in Wilson serves as both a guidepost and a warning: broad claims of relevance will no longer make it past the courtroom door.

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