Journal Article
19 December 2025
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Journal Article
19 December 2025
A Return to Roots: Guy v. Housing Authority of Augusta and the Revival of Common Law Sovereign Immunity
In late 2021, a shooting at a housing complex reignited a centuries-old question: when may a municipality claim the sovereign’s shield? In Guy v. Housing Authority of the City of Augusta (“Guy II”), the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated a court of appeals decision that had analogized a housing authority to a state agency and thus found it immune from suit. In its decision, the supreme court explained that such questions must be resolved by examining whether the entity would have been immune under English common law as it existed in 1776. The case was remanded for the lower court to apply this test and determine whether the Housing Authority of the City of Augusta was immune from suit. The supreme court’s decision in Guy marks a jurisprudential shift, requiring courts to base sovereign immunity analyses on English common law rather than analogizing municipal entities to state agencies.Current Articles
Journal Article19 December 2025
Masthead
Journal Article19 December 2025
Table of Contents
Journal Article19 December 2025
Editor's Note
Journal Article19 December 2025
Georgia's Best Friend
“Chief Justice Michael Boggs is one of my very best friends in life,” say people all over the great State of Georgia, including me. Rare is the man who has such a clear sense of purpose and who derives so much joy in being a true friend to the people around him. And by that, I refer to his tight-knit inner circle and the broader community at large: his wife, his immediate family, his extended family, his local community, his legal community, and also the people who make Georgia their home.Journal Article19 December 2025
An Exception to Prove the Rule: Rebutting the Presumption of a Consistent and Definitive Construction
Because the State of Georgia has had ten constitutions since declaring independence from Great Britain, the history of those prior constitutions has a lot to do with understanding the Constitution in force today. In particular, when a provision is carried forward from one constitution to the next without material change, the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decisions interpreting that provision under an earlier constitution can be a key piece of evidence for understanding its meaning in the later one. The Supreme Court of Georgia calls this piece of the historical inquiry the presumption of a consistent and definitive construction: the provision so construed “is presumed to carry the same meaning as that consistent construction.” The court has acknowledged and alluded to the possibility that the presumption can be overcome, but it never has been. And it is not yet clear how the presumption could be overcome.Journal Article19 December 2025
Standing Apart: Wasserman v. Franklin County and the End of Third-Party Standing in Georgia
In Wasserman v. Franklin County, the Supreme Court of Georgia ended third-party standing, reasoning that the Georgia Constitution does not provide for it and that principles of stare decisis do not require that Georgia courts continue to follow the third-party standing doctrine. While Georgia courts imported the federal third-party standing doctrine in 2007, the supreme court abandoned it approximately eighteen years later. Beginning in Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Board Of Commissioners (“SCV”), the court narrowed the scope of standing under Georgia law. This case also reflects a broader trend in which the court strictly construes the language of Georgia statutory law. This Article will proceed with an analysis of the Wasserman case and its holding, including the historical context, its impact on third-party standing, and how the court is likely to approach statutory and constitutional interpretation–even in the face of well-established precedent. Finally, the Article will conclude with practical suggestions regarding how best to proceed in a post-Wasserman landscape.Journal Article19 December 2025
The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Georgia
This Article provides a survey of the right to keep and bear arms in Georgia as it has developed from colonial times to the present. While this Article is not about the Second Amendment, references to that amendment cannot be avoided because the two are intertwined. The Article follows Georgia’s right to keep and bear arms in roughly chronological order, where discreet periods in history can be seen to have heavy influence on laws impacting the right to keep and bear arms. These periods include Colonial, Antebellum, Civil War years, Reconstruction and late nineteenth century, early twentieth century, and finally late twentieth century to the twenty-first century. A recurring theme, at least through the mid-twentieth century, is a profound influence of racism on gun laws in Georgia.Journal Article19 December 2025
Does Georgia’s Code Have the Force of Law? Early Codification Practices and Constitutional Questions
In 1858, Georgia’s General Assembly commissioned the state’s first official code. The legislature appointed three men to assemble a lengthy volume that included all the legislative acts that were in force at the time. Besides statutes, the General Assembly also tasked the codifiers with codifying legal principles of the English common law, Georgia Supreme Court decisions, and English statutes that were still in force. As a result, the codifiers inserted hundreds of provisions into the code that they wrote in an attempt to distill these legal principles into statutory form. When the codifiers’ work was done, the General Assembly adopted the code and gave its provisions the force of law, regardless of whether those provisions had previously been enacted by the General Assembly or written for the first time by the codifiers. This same basic process was followed until the modern code was adopted. From 1863 until 1933, new codes incorporated both new legislative acts and statutes written by codifiers rather than the General Assembly. This might not seem problematic at first blush. Though codifier-drafted statutes might have gotten less individual consideration from the legislature, the General Assembly still ultimately passed a bill enacting those provisions into law. But there could be a serious defect with this process. Georgia’s constitution contains a “single subject matter” rule, which requires that laws adopted by the General Assembly relate to only a single subject. The codes, of course, touched on a wide variety of unrelated topics from crimes to contracts, the organization of the government, taxes, and more. Arguably, then, the adoption of codifier-drafted statutes in the code violated the constitution. Such a theory might seem far-fetched, but a dissenting opinion from the Georgia Supreme Court has seemingly endorsed the logic behind this idea. But why should anyone care about laws that may or may not have been constitutionally enacted so long ago? The answer lies in the fact that, each time a code was adopted, the new code retained many statutes written by the earlier codifiers. As a result, many statutes in Georgia’s code today are the same ones written by the original codifiers. And those statutes were only ever adopted in a single code-adoption bill. If every code adoption was unconstitutional, the hundreds of codifier-drafted statutes still in force today would all be invalid. The ramifications of that result could be far-reaching. But this Article argues that the effect of the state’s early codification practices is not so dramatic. Applying the Georgia Supreme Court’s single-subject jurisprudence would actually validate the acts that adopted the codes. This is because the code adoption acts did have a single objective: adopting a comprehensive code of laws. With a possible invalidation of these statutes off the table, this Article argues that the unique history of codifier- drafted statutes should still play a role in how courts interpret those that remain in the code today.Journal Article19 December 2025
State Constitutional Law: Developments in Georgia Election
Since the 2018 election, the election process in Georgia has been subjected to intense scrutiny both on the campaign trail and in the courtroom through a variety of lawsuits. Cases in superior courts and the Supreme Court of Georgia have challenged everything from candidate eligibility to election outcomes to the voting machines used in elections. While much of the highest-profile litigation has been in federal court, state law regarding election administration and post-election contests has developed in significant ways during that time period. This Article reviews some of the most significant cases involving Georgia election law that have made their way through the state’s courts over the past seven years. For purposes of this Article, the definition of “election law” roughly tracks the definition the Supreme Court of Georgia uses when defining what are “cases of election contest” under article VI, section VI, paragraph 2 of the Georgia Constitution: “challenges to the candidates for and results of elections,” including pre-election challenges to the eligibility of candidates and also includes challenges to election administration generally. This Survey first provides a general overview of Georgia’s statutory structure for elections in Section II. This includes the role and responsibilities of the various officials involved in administering elections. It then considers the development of standing law in Georgia and how that impacts election-related litigation in Section III, especially the relevance to challenges to election procedures. The Survey then reviews the standards that apply to pre-election and post-election challenges in Sections IV and V. It then considers some specific elements of cases, including challenges to voting machines in Section VI, and the supreme court’s recent requirement of expedition in voting cases in Section VII. As long as Georgia remains a battleground state with close elections, litigation over the administration of elections will continue. While Georgia law has developed significantly over the past seven years, there is no indication that the trend to run to court to deal with close elections will change at any point soon.Journal Article19 December 2025
Business Associations
This Article surveys a selection of noteworthy cases involving business associations that Georgia courts decided between June 1, 2024, and May 31, 2025.Journal Article19 December 2025
Torts
2024–2025 was a big year for tort law in Georgia, particularly on the legislative side. Governor Brian Kemp achieved his primary goal for the 2025 legislative session, working with the Georgia General Assembly to enact significant tort reform measures. These measures change Georgia law on the collateral source rule, the relevance of seatbelt evidence, and—most notably—in the area of negligent security. All of these changes benefit tort defendants. The Supreme Court of Georgia also made its mark on tort law during the Survey period, deciding several cases involving the liability of professionals and adopting rules that— more often than not—benefited tort plaintiffs.Journal Article19 December 2025
Trial Practice and Procedure
This Article addresses selected opinions and legislation of interest to the Georgia civil trial practitioner issued during the survey period of this publication.Journal Article19 December 2025
Labor and Employment Law
This Article surveys recent developments in the state statutory and common law that affect labor and employment relations of Georgia employers. Accordingly, it surveys published decisions from the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Court of Appeals of Georgia from June 1, 2024 to May 31, 2025. This Article also includes highlights of certain revisions to the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (“O.C.G.A.”).Journal Article19 December 2025
State and Local Taxation
This Article surveys the most critical and comprehensive changes in Georgia law occurring between June 1, 2024, and May 31, 2025. Most notably, this Article discusses changes to tax credits impacting Georgia’s film industry, further clarifications to Georgia’s taxicab tax regulations, important changes to property taxes on conservation properties, and other important state and local taxation topics.Journal Article19 December 2025
Between Relevance and Remedy: Trial Court Discretion in Georgia Evidence Law
The admissibility of evidence in Georgia civil litigation continues to rest on a foundational principle: deference to the trial court’s discretion. Georgia appellate courts have consistently reaffirmed that evidentiary rulings—particularly those involving complex or fact-sensitive considerations—will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. This standard reflects the institutional competence of trial courts, which are uniquely positioned to evaluate the credibility of parties, assess the probative value of evidence, and manage the presentation of issues throughout the course of litigation. While portions of Georgia’s Evidence Code closely mirror the Federal Rules of Evidence—permitting persuasive use of federal case law in interpretation—the governing approach remains one of judicial restraint on appellate review, especially where the record supports the trial court’s reasoning. From 2024 through 2025, this doctrinal deference has been applied with increasing prominence across a range of civil litigation contexts, including expert testimony under Daubert, discovery of sensitive medical and financial records, and the treatment of allegedly spoliated evidence. Notably, in City of Atlanta v. Perkins, the Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld the trial court’s evidentiary and spoliation rulings, reaffirming that the discretion of trial courts encompasses not only admissibility determinations but also the imposition of sanctions designed to address litigation misconduct. Likewise, in Medernix, LLC v. Snowden, the appellate court clarified the scope of the harmless error doctrine in the context of discovery disputes concerning medical settlements, emphasizing that errors in evidence admission do not warrant reversal unless prejudicial. Collectively, these cases underscore a broader jurisprudential trend: while Georgia law continues to evolve alongside federal evidentiary standards, the trial court’s gatekeeping role remains paramount in ensuring fairness, efficiency, and integrity in the adjudication of civil claims.Journal Article19 December 2025
Insurance
During this Survey period, the courts in Georgia issued several meaningful decisions in the area of insurance. In the first party context, the court reinforced its disfavor for litigants taking inconsistent legal positions to their benefit by reinforcing the robust application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. In addition, Georgia courts revisited the propriety of the manner in which an insurance carrier evaluates actual cash value for the purposes of determining recovery for diminution in value in property claims involving damage to automobiles. Finally, courts expanded the ability of plaintiffs to recover damages for claims other than breach of contract in first party property claims litigation. In third party coverage litigation, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia provided more certainty around diversity jurisdiction for liability coverage cases. The Court of Appeals of Georgia held that liability insurers can be named in a direct action involving rideshare drivers. In a case of first impression, an insurer has a duty to defend a sex-trafficking claim, even when the policy includes “abuse or molestation” and “assault or battery” exclusions. In the uninsured motorist context, O.C.G.A. § 33-1-24 abrogates the receipt of premium test for ride share cases. In addition, a passenger shot in a vehicle was not “using” the vehicle for the purposes of UM coverage.Journal Article19 December 2025
Legal Ethics
This Survey covers the period from June 1, 2024–May 31, 2025. The Article discusses developments with respect to lawyer discipline, bar admission and reinstatement, malpractice, ineffective assistance of counsel, disqualification of counsel, judicial misconduct and recusal, attorney’s fees and liens, contempt and other sanctions, unauthorized practice of law, attorney-client privilege, prosecutorial misconduct, amendments to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, advisory opinions, one miscellaneous matter, and potential reforms to the delivery of legal services.Journal Article19 December 2025
Workers’ Compensation
This Survey period saw notable decisions from Georgia’s appellate courts addressing issues including a potential limiting effect on employees’ misrepresentations in the hiring process, the refusal of suitable light duty work, and application of the exclusive remedy provision to civil suits. There was no notable legislation, as the legislature was instead occupied with the “tort reform” bill, Senate Bill 68, which includes virtually no reference to workers’ compensation.Journal Article19 December 2025
Construction Law
Over the past year, the state and federal courts in Georgia issued orders and opinions on a variety of topics affecting the construction industry. This Article discusses some of the most important of these cases.Journal Article19 December 2025
Local Government
Last year’s survey showed that the appellate courts in Georgia were reluctant to rule that a public official had violated a ministerial duty and thus were willing to hold that public officials were entitled to official immunity. This year, however, at least one case showed a swing in the other direction, with the Court of Appeals of Georgia holding that official immunity can be overcome, despite the existence of some discretionary language in a policy.Journal Article19 December 2025
Zoning and Land Use Law
This year’s Georgia Survey on zoning law analyzes new developments in case law and legislation over the Survey period. It analyzes the impact and aftermath of the Supreme Court of Georgia’s opinion in State v. SASS Group, LLC. SASS Group was the first case arising under the 2020 amendment to the Georgia Constitution of 1983, which permitted a limited waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity for declaratory judgment claims alleging that an action of a government official was unconstitutional. Though SASS Group did not factually involve a zoning decision, its holding impacted how and against whom an appeal of a zoning decision may be brought. Litigation interpreting the SASS Group opinion continued during the Survey period, and its application to zoning law is reviewed herein. This year’s Survey also focuses on the enactment of House Bill (“HB”) 155. HB 155 revised several statutes relevant to zoning and land use... This Article asks whether HB 155 has finally resolved more than ten years of litigation that produced numerous conflicting opinions as to whether a rezoning action is legislative or quasi-judicial. Additionally, this year’s Survey reviews other decisions of note during the Survey Period on zoning and land use law. Finally, this Article provides an update on a case discussed in last year’s Survey—Morgan County Hospital Authority v. City of Madison.Journal Article19 December 2025
Beyond Gary v. State: Paragraph XIII and the Future of Georgia’s Exclusionary Rule
While lawyers across Georgia routinely file motions to suppress evidence in the state’s superior courts, many may never stop to consider what actually affords their clients that right. Practitioners preparing these motions quickly discover one of the most significant recent developments in modern Georgia criminal law: the debate over the scope of a criminal defendant’s constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and, more importantly, when courts must suppress evidence obtained in violation of those rights. Will the Georgia Supreme Court overturn Gary v. State in full and adopt a good-faith exception? If so, can criminal defense attorneys look to a Georgia state-specific exclusionary rule? In the spirit of the Georgia Supreme Court’s invitation for state constitutional arguments and the Mercer Law Review’s commitment to state constitutional rediscovery, this Comment argues that the future of Georgia’s exclusionary rule lies not in federal lockstep but in a state-specific exclusionary rule grounded in the Paragraph XIII of the Georgia Constitution, illuminated by Williams v. State, and given effect through O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30.Journal Article19 December 2025
Still a Deal with the Devil? Mary Carter Agreements and the Integrity of Civil Jury Trials
This Comment examines how jurisdictions treat Mary Carter agreements today and why Georgia should prohibit them entirely. It explores a case currently on appeal before the Court of Appeals of Georgia that raises the issue, draws parallels to prohibited trial tactics under the Bruton Doctrine, and explains why limiting instructions fail to cure the prejudice these agreements create. It raises questions about whether Mary Carter agreements even present a justiciable controversy. It also considers the tension between the competing values at stake: promoting settlements and judicial efficiency on one side, versus safeguarding fairness and the integrity of litigation on the other. Ultimately, it argues that even with disclosure requirements, courts should abolish Mary Carter agreements.Journal Article19 December 2025
Saints, Sinners, and Standard Agreements: Rethinking Morality Clauses in Georgia
This Comment situates morality clauses within Georgia’s broader contract and employment law framework, while also drawing lessons from New York and California. Part I traces the history and function of morality clauses, distinguishing between express and implied provisions, as well as reputational and conduct-based triggers. Part II examines how New York and California have approached morality clauses, emphasizing their reliance on public policy to limit enforceability. Part III turns to Georgia, analyzing how morality provisions are interpreted in light of at-will employment, identifying common drafting pitfalls, and offering practical guidance for attorneys. Part IV looks ahead, considering how Georgia law might evolve if it moves toward the public-policy-driven approach seen in other jurisdictions. Ultimately, this Comment argues that while Georgia’s permissive stance currently favors employers, attorneys should draft morality clauses with precision, clarity, and statutory awareness, not only to minimize present risks, but also to prepare for a legal landscape that may increasingly prioritize fairness, privacy, and public policy.Journal Article19 December 2025
A Return to Roots: Guy v. Housing Authority of Augusta and the Revival of Common Law Sovereign Immunity
In late 2021, a shooting at a housing complex reignited a centuries-old question: when may a municipality claim the sovereign’s shield? In Guy v. Housing Authority of the City of Augusta (“Guy II”), the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated a court of appeals decision that had analogized a housing authority to a state agency and thus found it immune from suit. In its decision, the supreme court explained that such questions must be resolved by examining whether the entity would have been immune under English common law as it existed in 1776. The case was remanded for the lower court to apply this test and determine whether the Housing Authority of the City of Augusta was immune from suit. The supreme court’s decision in Guy marks a jurisprudential shift, requiring courts to base sovereign immunity analyses on English common law rather than analogizing municipal entities to state agencies.Journal Article19 December 2025
From Classroom to Courtroom: Vicarious Liability in Clinical Education
Vicarious liability has progressively extended its reach into the healthcare field. The advancement of clinical education and increased presence of medical students in the healthcare setting raises the question of who bears the legal responsibility for a student’s wrongful acts or omissions during the provision of medical care. In an attempt to conform to traditional tort ideals, should a medical student be solely responsible for their own actions? Conversely, should the medical institution or supervising physician pay the price of a student’s mistakes? Statham v. Quang demonstrates this tension and represents the Supreme Court of Georgia’s attempt to strike a balance between providing an injured plaintiff with a meaningful remedy and identifying which party should bear this legal burden.Most Popular Articles
Journal Article
1 May 1998
Maryland v. Wilson: The Fading Fourth Amendment
In Maryland v. Wilson, the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer may order a passenger of a lawfully stepped car to exit the vehicle. This "bright-line rule" allows these intrusions as a matter of course and does not require case-by-case determination.Journal Article
1 July 1976
The Economic Effects of Monopoly: A Lawyer's Guide to Antitrust Economics
Four factors were influential in my decision to write this survey paper summarizing what economists believe theoretically and have found empirically to be the major economic (and noneconomic) effects of monopoly. First, in my work as an expert witness in antitrust cases representing both private parties and public bodies, I have found a glaring lacuna in the minds of some judges, a number of lawyers and most jurors in the area of antitrust economics. Second, this feeling has been fortified by my guest lectures in antitrust law courses; while the students are bright and the teacher dedicated, an acceptable level of competence in antitrust economics had successfully evaded its pursuers. Third, my reading of several law journals has convinced me that there are a large number of legally competent antitrust lawyers who are not very familiar with antitrust economics. Finally, I was motivated by the growing realization that people do not regard antitrust violations as very serious. The July 1974 issue of SCIENCE DIGEST reported a cross-section study of Baltimore residents in which the respondents were asked to rate the seriousness of crimes from 9 (most serious) to 1 (least serious). The highest mean score recorded was "planned killing of a policeman" (8.474), and the lowest mean score was "being drunk in public places" (2.849). Of the 140 crimes listed three were of an antitrust genus. "Fixing prices of a consumer product like gasoline" ranked 126 from the top (4.629), "fixing prices of machines sold to businesses" ranked 127 (4.619), and "false advertising of a headache remedy" ranked 132 (4.083). Offenses such as "breaking a plate glass window in a shop," "refusal to make essential repairs in rental property," "shoplifting a carton of cigarettes from a supermarket," "driving while license is suspended," "lending money at illegal interest rates," "joining a riot," and "using pep pills" are each regarded as more serious than the antitrust violations! In Part I we will explore in some detail the economic (and some noneconomic) effects of monopoly. In Part II we will examine briefly public policies toward monopoly.Journal Article
1 March 2022
The Protection of Freedom of Expression from Social Media Platforms
Social media platforms have overturned the previously known system of public communication. As predicted at the outset, the spread of the public Internet that started three decades ago has resulted in a paradigm shift in this field. Now, anyone can publish their opinion outside the legacy media, at no significant cost, and can become known and be discussed by others. Due to the technological characteristics of the Internet, it might also be expected that this kind of mass expression, with such an abundance of content, would necessitate the emergence of gatekeepers, similar in function to the ones that existed earlier for conventional media. The newsagent, post office, and cable or satellite services have been replaced by the Internet service provider, the server (host) provider and the like. However, no one could have foreseen that the new gatekeepers of online communication would not only be neutral transmitters or repositories but also active shapers of the communication process, deciding on which user content on the Internet they deemed undesirable and deciding which content, out of all the theoretically accessible content, is actually displayed to individual users. Content filtering, deleting, blocking, suspending, and ranking are all types of active interference with the exercise of users’ freedom of speech and practices which also affect the interests of other users in obtaining information. All this became an even greater and more difficult-to-manage issue when, in certain sub-markets of the Internet, certain giant tech companies’ services gained a monopoly or came close to doing so. This process has emerged in connection with gatekeepers of a specific type: the most important online platforms (social media, video sharing, search engines, web stores). In this way, a new, unexpected obstacle to the exercise of freedom of speech appeared, with the result that the earlier constitutional doctrines could no longer be applied without any change. The crux of the problem is that the platforms are privately owned. In formal terms, they are simply market players which are not bound by the guarantees of freedom of speech imposed on public bodies and which may enjoy the protection of freedom of speech themselves.Journal Article
1 December 2014
Journal Article
1 March 1992
Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict
The availability of assassination of foreign leaders as a means of achieving United States foreign policy objectives is an issue that has proven in recent years to be a recurring one. However, it does not arise in isolation; instead it is almost always part of a larger political controversy over United States foreign policy objectives and whether force of any kind should be used to pursue them. Certainly this was true with regard to the controversies that surrounded United States policy, including alleged involvement in assassination plots toward Cuba, Vietnam, the Congo, and the Dominican Republic in the 1960s, and toward Chile in the early 1970s. It is also true, though to a lesser degree, of more recent debates concerning the United States air strike against Libya in April 1986 and the role of the United States in Panama prior to the December 1989 invasion. In each case there was, or later developed, significant disagreement over the appropriateness of United States policy toward the nation involved and over the use of force to induce changes in the nature or activities of its government. Inevitably, such disagreements have tended to distract attention from the manner in which force might be applied; if the chosen objective appears not to be a legitimate one or if the use of force seems unjustified, the relative merit of an -attack on a military installation, for example, as seriously or productively considered. The recent war in the Persian Gulf has again revived the controversy and provided a new opportunity for debate. This time, however, the issue appeared more starkly framed than previously. Public doubt as to the legitimacy of the immediate objective-the ejection of Iraq from Kuwait-was for the most part absent, and although there was disagreement about the timing and amount of coercion to be used, force was generally perceived as a legitimate option. The American public perceived Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, hardly a sympathetic image, as probably the least ambiguous villain of the second half of the twentieth century. Unchallenged by any significant political opposition prior to the war, he appeared as the sole instigator of Iraq's seizure of Kuwait, as well as the cause of its intransigence in the face of international insistence that it withdraw.Journal Article
1 May 1993