Publication Date
4-3-2026
Document Type
Casenote
Abstract
Georgia’s insanity defenses have long reflected tension between accountability and mental illness. The State’s statutory framework, which preserves both a “mental incapacity” and “delusional compulsion” defense, reflects this tension. Yet for decades, the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Bailey v. State imposed a judicial limitation: a defendant who “brought about” her own delusion through voluntary acts or omissions could not claim insanity. The court’s recent decision in State v. Wierson marks a turning point. In Wierson, the court considered whether noncompliance with psychiatric medication preempts the defendant from invoking statutory insanity defenses. Rejecting Bailey, the court reasserted the primacy of statutory text and clarified that insanity defenses hinge solely on the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense, not the prior causes of that condition.
Through its factual background, legal reasoning, and broader implications, Wierson marks a pivotal shift toward textualism in Georgia’s insanity defense jurisprudence, carrying significant consequences for mental-health law, evidentiary practice, and legislative authority.
Recommended Citation
Katz, Max Jordan
(2026)
"Delusions of Judicial Grandeur: State v. Wierson and the Return to Statutory Sanity,"
Mercer Law Review: Vol. 77:
No.
3, Article 13.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol77/iss3/13