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Devin Humphreys

Publication Date

2-27-2026

Document Type

Article

Abstract

Some customs unions look like glorified trade deals, while other customs unions look like nation‑states in the making. Since 1979, U.S. trade law has treated both kinds of customs unions the same, but this state of affairs ignores the variety of ways in which some (though not all) modern customs unions are remarkably economically integrated. Presidents from both parties have treated the European Union as a singular entity in regulating foreign trade with their Section 232 authority, and more recently, the current presidential administration has issued ad valorem tariffs against the European Union as a bloc. But due to a statutory prohibition, similar treatment cannot be afforded to the EU, or other similarly sophisticated customs unions, when it comes to antidumping law. In this Article, I argue that in light of both increased economic integration by customs unions around the world and the treatment of some of those customs unions in other contexts, Congress should reconsider how U.S. antidumping law treats countries which are parties to sophisticated customs unions—that is, mansion markets. When a customs union has fully or nearly fully removed barriers to trade, making distinctions between the countries inside that union for trade law purposes would be like foreign countries making distinctions between different U.S. states. While not all customs unions are created equal, the purpose of some customs unions is to give products within those unions a mansion market, and American antidumping law should be clarified to recognize this distinction.

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