A Rose by Any Other Name Would Smell as Diluted: Does the Eleventh Circuit’s Interpretation of the Gingles’ Preconditions in Rose v. Sec’y Lack Poetic Justice?

Authors

Lucious Moore

Publication Date

4-2025

Document Type

Casenote

Abstract

It’s 2009 and Georgia regulators, against the protests of local residents, have approved the construction of two new nuclear reactors in the Shell Bluff community. Located in Burke County, Shell Bluff, an unincorporated community with a majority Black population, is all too familiar with the harmful environmental effects that stem from radioactive waste. It’s June 2020, the height of the COVID‑19 pandemic, and regulators in Georgia have ended the temporary moratorium which prevented utility companies from disconnecting service for customers who have fallen behind on payments. An abrupt decision just three months into a pandemic which, by November 2020, saw Black Georgians file 93% more unemployment claims than their white counterparts, a statistic that lends credibility to the “last hired, first fired” theory. Finally, it’s September 2024 and during an eleven‑minute meeting, state regulators unanimously approved the building of a 4.5 mile rail spur. The approval will allow Sandersville Railroad Co. to acquire the land needed for the rail spur in Sparta, another majority Black community, by eminent domain causing several Black families to be displaced from their homes against their will. There is a common theme here, aside from the devastating effects these decisions have had on Georgia’s Black community. Each of these decisions were instituted by the Georgia Public Service Commission (PSC), a little‑known yet powerful group that regulates the state’s utilities.

In Georgia, the regulation of public utilities and voting rights have met at a unique intersection that furthers the conversation on intersectionality, particularly the impact of facially race‑neutral laws on marginalized communities. The case of Rose v. Sec’y highlights the struggles that plaintiffs in the Eleventh Circuit face when utilizing Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in asserting claims of vote dilution. Not only must a plaintiff provide the court with evidence of government acts creating a diluted voter pool, but the plaintiff must also present the court with a viable remedy prior to the merits of the allegations being weighed.

Recommended Citation

Moore, Lucious (2025) "A Rose by Any Other Name Would Smell as Diluted: Does the Eleventh Circuit’s Interpretation of the Gingles’ Preconditions in Rose v. Sec’y Lack Poetic Justice?," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 76: No. 2, Article 11.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol76/iss2/11