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It comes as no surprise to those tuned into Georgia jurisprudence—textualism has taken root in the Supreme Court of Georgia. Since a series of holdings in the late twenty-tens including Olevik v. State, Georgia courts have produced a steady stream of decisions committed to pointing legal interpretation back to the intent of the framers. At first glance, the court’s proclamation in State v. SASS Group, LLC that “action” as it is used in Article I, Section II, Paragraph V(b) of the Georgia Constitution refers to an entire lawsuit appears simply to be another instance of the court’s staunch commitment to textualist principles. But, SASS Group, LLC raises an important question in the broader scheme of the court’s approach: If the word “action,” “‘means what it says and says what it means’” here, what does this mean for the interpretation of this word in the other thirty-four appearances that it makes in the Georgia Constitution or any other legal provisions? As one of the first cases to apply these principles to a word so deeply ingrained in legal vernacular, SASS Group, LLC puts textualism to the test.