In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the United States Supreme Court seemingly tightened general federal pleading requirements, expressly abrogating a much-cited linguistic formula from Conley v. Gibson and making the avoidance of early dismissals more difficult for plaintiffs. To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, plaintiffs filing antitrust suits alleging conspiracy must set forth enough facts in the pleadings to suggest a preceding agreement, as distinct from parallel, independent action-at least where the parallel conduct is readily explained by lawful business motivations. The Court further declared that to withstand a motion to dismiss for legal insufficiency, a complaint must contain enough allegations of fact to make it "plausible," rather than merely conceivable, that discovery will disclose grounds for each required element of a plaintiff's particular claim. Applied generally, this test will make the lenient "notice pleading" regime exemplified by Conley significantly more stringent.
Pelot, Amber A.
"Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: Mere Adjustment or Stringent New Requirement in Pleading?,"
Mercer Law Review: Vol. 59
, Article 16.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol59/iss4/16