Since the late sixties the field of creditors' remedies has undergone a series of changes brought about by several U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Old concepts of protection for the creditor have been changed or modified to recognize procedural due process rights of the debtor. While it is easy to say that there have been changes, it is becoming increasingly more difficult to identify exactly what is required by the courts to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
When the U.S. Supreme Court declared the Georgia prejudgment garnishment statutes unconstitutional in North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, the Georgia legislature responded by passing new statutes which were apparently aimed at meeting the due process requirements established by earlier cases.' Before this new statute could be tested, a challenge to the old code section as applied to post-judgment garnishment came before the Georgia Supreme Court. Coursin v. Harper presented the question of whether post-judgment garnishment required due process protection similar to pre-judgment garnishment. The supreme court answered in the affirmative.
The Georgia Supreme Court held that due process was required in postjudgment garnishment as well as pre-judgment cases. But what procedures meet due process standards? The question now facing Georgia lawyers is whether the new Georgia Code section dealing with garnishment is constitutionally sufficient.
This comment will review recent developments in due process requirements for creditors' remedies with particular emphasis on their impact on Georgia garnishment law, and will include a meaningful background in this field as well as present an analysis of the status of Georgia garnishment law with suggestions as to the probable direction future decisions will take.
Badgley, Richard B. and Swick, Michael F.
"Can Georgia Bank on Its Garnishment Laws?*,"
Mercer Law Review: Vol. 28:
1, Article 21.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol28/iss1/21